To the average Dominican on the street, if asked what Hezbollah is, they would probably answer:
“What is that even supposed to mean?”
Even in the United States and around the world, people have been asking the same question for decades.
What is Hezbollah? Why has Lebanon been unable to remove this tumor from its political and social system?
The answer is simple and can be summarized in a single word: FEAR. Hezbollah does not merely occupy southern Lebanon; it also occupies the psychology of an entire population through systematic terror. It is a machine of power built on permanent threats, on the bomb as a political argument, on violence as the language of a state within a state.
Hezbollah, which thrives on the industry of terror, eventually ran into a harsh reality: policies based on terror cannot be financed by ideals alone. That is why, despite the funding it receives from Iran for their shared objectives, it became increasingly difficult for that money to arrive on time when urgency demanded it, as is the case today.
Sanctions imposed by the United States and the economic blockades on Iran placed Hezbollah in a complicated position, and in times of war, one cannot afford to wait for an ambulance.
It is at this point that Hezbollah and its allies added a new criminal act to their repertoire: narco-terrorism.
To understand how this logic traveled beyond the Mediterranean, one must look back to Latin America.
When Hezbollah arrived in Colombia, it did not come empty-handed. It arrived like Angus MacGyver, armed with knowledge and with an offer that the ELN and the FARC could not refuse: the transfer of a doctrine of terror refined over decades in the Middle East.
According to the intelligence and regional security analysis community, operational pacts were sealed between these organizations. This was not a mere exchange of tactics; it was an ideological and technical transmission of the “art” of subjugating an entire society through the destructive power of explosives.
The bomb as an instrument for governing through fear.
That is why it became common to see four types of nationals operating within drug trafficking groups: Colombians, Venezuelans, Dominicans, and Lebanese. This can be observed in the analysis The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking, prepared by Brigadier General (Ret.) Russell D. Howard and Colleen Traughber for the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU, 2013), which examined cases in which extremist organizations intersect with criminal activities in the Western Hemisphere, including the Dominican Republic.
The document is available in open source:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-D-PURL-gpo81104/pdf/GOVPUB-D-PURL-gpo81104.pdf
When Venezuela succumbed to the weight of international sanctions and Nicolás Maduro’s regime became financially suffocated, Hezbollah flew in like Superman without a cape to the rescue an historic opportunity.
The organization possessed exactly what the regime needed: the most efficient asset-laundering network on the planet, built upon a global Lebanese diaspora and a labyrinth of shell companies that challenge any conventional financial radar, facilitating the evasion of U.S. sanctions with the Dominican Republic as an enclave.
In this context, businessman Alex Saab, of Lebanese origin, has been identified by the United States government as a key financial operator for the Maduro regime. A report by Diario Libre documents that the Dassault Falcon 900EX aircraft used by Maduro remained in the Dominican Republic for several months before being confiscated by U.S. authorities. The aircraft had been used in the prisoner exchange that included Saab himself.
Source:
https://www.diariolibre.com/usa/actualidad/2024/09/02/ruta-del-avion-de-maduro-desde-su-compra-ilegal-hasta-llegada-a-rd/2837391
The question that inevitably arises is: why was that aircraft on Dominican soil?
Kapulett could explain the answer…
But this is where the story reaches the doorstep of the Dominican Republic.
In November 2016, the country received a visit that deserves careful examination. Gebran Bassil, then Lebanon’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived on the island. Officially, he sought to strengthen diplomatic and commercial ties. However, according to Arab media and later analyses, his agenda included seeking donations for the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and, indirectly, for Hezbollah’s financial structure.
According to Rabah, M. (2020), in his article titled “Hezbollah and its Christian allies are hijacking the Lebanese diaspora” for Al Arabiya:
“For Bassil, supporting and protecting Lebanon means donating to the FPM and supporting its endless quest for more power. His extensive travels abroad and meetings with the diaspora are tools used by the FPM-Hezbollah axis to expand and identify its network of business partners.”
Makram Rabah is an assistant professor in the Department of History at the American University of Beirut.
Source:
https://english.alarabiya.net/views/news/middle-east/2019/10/03/Hezbollah-and-its-Christian-allies-are-hijacking-the-Lebanese-diaspora
But why is this information essential to understanding the risks facing the Dominican Republic?
Because Diario Libre recorded the visit on November 23, 2016, in an article titled “Abinader to host lunch for Lebanon’s Foreign Minister.”
Source:
https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/politica/abinader-ofrecera-almuerzo-a-ministro-de-exteriores-del-libano-EF5564035
That lunch was organized by Luis Abinader, who at the time was a prominent figure within the Dominican business and political community of Lebanese descent. The meeting brought together business leaders from the Lebanese community in Santo Domingo a photograph of a gathering among political allies that, in light of what followed, carries a different weight.
On November 6, 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Gebran Bassil under the Global Magnitsky Act, accusing him of participating in acts of corruption and strengthening a political system that directly benefits Hezbollah’s allies within the Lebanese government.
After the sanction, Bassil stated that the measure was “unjust and politicized,” and claimed that U.S. officials had previously asked him to sever his relationship with Hezbollah, which he refused to do.
The logic is simple: a man who refuses to abandon Hezbollah when Washington demands it is not a casual ally of the organization. He is structurally part of it.
THE PROFESSOR WHO SAID IT FIRST
To understand the true danger of these visits, one must look into the cracks of digital history.
In an interview removed from the archives of The Business Year, titled “Staying Positive,” Nabil Itani, then director of IDAL (Investment Development Authority of Lebanon), was explicit about the purpose of Lebanese diaspora diplomacy:
“The initiative to engage our diaspora is a unified effort by IDAL, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the private sector.”
This takes us back to what Professor Makram Rabah of the American University of Beirut said, going even further by revealing the true background of these international tours: Bassil’s visits were not conventional diplomacy. They were a strategic avenue to build a global network of commercial and financial allies for Hezbollah, using the Lebanese diaspora as a bridge between the armed party and the local economies of each country visited.
One year after the lunch in Santo Domingo, at the Lebanese Diaspora Energy (LDE) event held in Lebanon, Luis Abinader was the star figure of the opening ceremony.
He took the main stage as guest of honor at an event whose institutional architecture directly involved figures now sanctioned by the United States.
Putting Luis Abinader in charge of the opening at an event like this, where the Dominican Republic does not even appear on the map of the Lebanese diaspora, was not done without purpose.
A favor returned for a favor granted.
The question is not rhetorical: what kind of value does a Dominican politician hold for a Lebanese diaspora event linked to Hezbollah?
This is not a judicial accusation. It is an open-source analysis. It is a warning born from genuine concern for Dominican national security.
Observe the sanctions photograph: on one side, Alaa Hamieh, a member of IDAL, sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department for financing Hezbollah. On the other, Gebran Bassil, the institutional architect of Lebanese Diaspora Energy, also under sanctions for the same reason.
Two key figures in this network, both with documented ties to the ecosystem in which the Dominican Republic was included as a tour destination.
What does the sanction against Alaa Hamieh say?
And this is particularly revealing, because it connects directly with what Professor Makram Rabah and IDAL chief Nabil Itani stated.
The sanction states:
“a network of 16 individuals and entities led by Hezbollah financier and former public investment official Alaa Hassan Hamieh (Alaa Hamieh). Alaa Hamieh oversees a network of companies, controlled through family members and close associates, that launder and raise funds for Hezbollah’s financial team. These individuals and companies, located in Lebanon, Syria, Poland, Slovenia, Qatar, and Canada, have participated in numerous economic projects and are estimated to have diverted more than $100 million since 2020.”
…and how can one not recall the Dominican president’s repeated trips to Qatar?
But what is interesting is that two pillars of this network are already under scrutiny by the U.S. Treasury Department, and the question no Dominican official has publicly answered is this:
who will be the next name to appear?
Kapulett’s concern is legitimate and invites us to remember certain precedents.
The Dominican Republic’s connection with actors linked to international terrorism did not begin in 2016.
According to Listín Diario, a September 14, 2018 article titled “Puerto Plata was a meeting point for 9/11 terrorists” reported that former Dominican consul in Hamburg, Angelita Peña, stated that the CIA contacted her after the September 11, 2001 attacks because of a Dominican visa allegedly linked to Mohamed Atta.
According to the published testimony, Atta had traveled to Puerto Plata three weeks before the attack.
Of the 19 hijackers involved in 9/11, one was Lebanese national Ziad Jarrah, who piloted United Airlines Flight 93.
No serious intelligence system ignores this kind of historical precedent.
A report by El Testigo documented that the tanker Boceánica, sanctioned by the United States for alleged ties to Hezbollah-linked financing schemes, departed from the port of Azua in the Dominican Republic bound for Venezuela between 2024 and 2025.
A vessel sanctioned for ties to Hezbollah used Dominican ports as a point of departure toward Venezuela.
This fact does not require interpretation. It requires an answer.
None of the cited facts, by themselves, constitute judicial proof of terrorist activity on Dominican territory.
However, the combination of elements, including visits by sanctioned figures, personal links to actors within Hezbollah’s financial ecosystem, the transit of vessels under OFAC sanctions, allied military intelligence reports, diplomatic testimony, and the presence of residents connected to international investigations—forms a pattern that deserves urgent investigative attention from Dominican state institutions.
This article is part of an open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigation. All cited sources are public and verifiable. The analysis does not constitute a legal accusation against any natural or legal person.
